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One of the most important and vexing issues in health care concerns the cost to improve quality. Unfortunately,
quality is difficult to measure and potentially confounded with productivity. Rather than relying on
clinical or process measures, we infer quality at hospitals in greater Los Angeles from the revealed
preference of pneumonia patients. We then decompose the joint contribution of quality and unobserved
productivity to hospital costs, relying on heterogeneous tastes among patients for plausibly exogenous
quality variation. We find that more productive hospitals provide higher quality, demonstrating that
the cost of quality improvement is substantially understated by methods that do not take into account
productivity differences. After accounting for these differences, we find that a quality improvement
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would increase costs at the average hospital by nearly
fifty percent. Improvements in traditional metrics of hospital quality such as risk-adjusted mortality
are more modest, indicating that other factors such as amenities are an important driver of both hospital
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In recent years there have been prominent calls for quality improvement
within the health-care sector. The Institute of Medicine￿ s report Crossing
the Quality Chasm garnered national attention and spawned large research
e⁄orts devoted to measuring and improving quality (Institute of Medicine
(2001)). Yet quality improvement may be costly, and the value of qual-
ity turns on its costs as well as its bene￿ts (Cutler et al. (1998), Skinner
et al. (2006)). The stakes are high. We focus on hospital care, for which
expenditures totaled $611 billion in 2005 (Catlin et al. (2007))
The relationship between quality and costs in the hospital-care industry
is not well understood. There are two signi￿cant challenges in understanding
the cost of hospital quality. The ￿rst challenge is that quality is di¢ cult
to measure, potentially leading to attenuation bias in the cost of quality.
Hospitals are plausibly di⁄erentiated in the eyes of their customers in multiple
dimensions, and these patients may value aspects of the hospital experience
that are di¢ cult (if not impossible) for a researcher to observe.
Newhouse (1994) contrasts the hospital enterprise with an electric utility,
likening it instead to an airline. As with an airline, hospital amenities such as
caring and attentive sta⁄, good food, and pleasant surroundings are plausibly
important. Such amenities seem harder to quantify than clinical quality, and
public measures are only now under development.1
The second challenge in understanding the cost of hospital quality is that
more productive hospitals may supply higher quality. Economists have long
recognized that a ￿rm￿ s levels of inputs and outputs can depend on produc-
tivity (Marschak and Andrews, Jr. (1944), Nerlove (1965)). When higher
productivity lowers the marginal cost of quality or quantity, a relatively pro-
ductive hospital may choose to supply relatively high quality. Higher quality
hospitals are then relatively low-cost, and vice versa. If a researcher cannot
observe productivity, then quality may again appear to be less costly than is
truly the case.
Hospitals may be more or less productive because their boards of gover-
nors and/or managers are more or less e⁄ective. Furthermore, an unusual
feature of this setting may contribute to productivity di⁄erences. Phelps
(2002) emphasizes the simultaneous authority and lack of accountability of
physicians within the hospital organization. Harris (1977) argues that a hos-
1See http://www.hcahpsonline.org/.
2pital is actually two ￿rms, the medical sta⁄and the nominal administration,
whose objectives may con￿ ict. In addition to this issue of the physician￿ s
role, the boards that govern hospitals may confront more conventional chal-
lenges with respect to managerial agency.
As an empirical matter, Zuckerman et al. (1994)￿ s stochastic-frontier
analysis of the performance of U.S. hospitals in the mid-1980s attributes
nearly fourteen percent of total costs to ine¢ cient behavior. Such "inef-
￿ciency" can be interpreted as e¢ cient behavior among ￿rms with hetero-
geneous productivity (Stigler (1976), Van Biesebroeck (2004)). Some of
this apparent ine¢ ciency may also be attributable to aspects of the hospi-
tal experience that the researcher does not observe, that is, to di⁄erences in
unmeasured quality (Newhouse (1994)).
Evidence on the cost of hospital quality is remarkably limited. The most
direct evidence is concerned with quality of care, or clinical quality. When
Zuckerman et al. (1994) explicitly account for various measures of clinical
quality, the share of costs attributable to ine¢ ciency is una⁄ected, suggesting
that quality is not costly. Carey and Burgess, Jr. (1999) even ￿nd that lower
mortality decreases costs, albeit modestly, after instrumenting to deal with
measurement error. On the other hand, Morey et al. (1992) conclude that a
one-percent decrease in mortality is associated with a 1.34 percent increase
in hospital costs.
Carey (2000) o⁄ers indirect evidence pertinent to a broader conception of
quality that accounts for hospital amenities. In an analysis of hospital costs,
Carey ￿nds diseconomies of hospital scale under ordinary least squares but
scale economies under ￿xed-e⁄ects and correlated random-e⁄ects speci￿ca-
tions. In light of strong evidence (described later in the paper) that quality
in￿ uences hospital choice by patients, this pattern is consistent with unob-
served but costly quality. The author also remarks that other unobserved
factors, such as managerial e⁄ectiveness, may be important.
Our aim here is to understand the cost of hospital quality. Our framework
for meeting the challenges just described rests fundamentally on the assump-
tion that patients are informed about hospitals. As we discuss below, there
is considerable evidence that patients are at least somewhat aware of (and
value) clinical quality, and hospitals market themselves to patients on the
basis of amenities. We therefore infer quality from the revealed preference
of Medicare pneumonia patients for hospitals in greater Los Angeles. This
quality measure ￿ which we call "revealed quality" ￿ embodies all of the
aspects of the hospital experience that patients value, including amenities as
3well as clinical quality. We estimate revealed quality on the basis of existing
methods for analyzing consumer choices among di⁄erentiated products with
unobserved attributes (e.g., Berry et al. (1995)).
We then analyze the relationship between revealed quality and hospital
costs, again appealing to revealed preference. The hospital-choice analysis
demonstrates that patients prefer hospitals that are close to home, yet vary
in their taste for quality and hence their willingness to travel for it. As a
result, a hospital whose neighboring patients are more responsive to quality
has a greater incentive to supply costly quality. We argue that the "quality
responsiveness" of hospital demand is plausibly uncorrelated with unobserved
productivity and use it as an instrument for quality. Motivated by the
existing evidence on the cost of quality, we compare the cost of our revealed-
quality measure to the cost of clinical quality, as measured by pneumonia
mortality.
Our aim and revealed-preference approach are similar to those in Gertler
and Waldman (1992). This latter study is concerned with the cost of quality
in the nursing-home industry, for which quality is also di¢ cult to measure.
The authors deal with unobservable quality by specifying a reduced-form
model for a ￿rm￿ s latent choice of quality. The behavior of consumers is
essential to identi￿cation: the taste for quality facing each ￿rm is assumed
to be exogenous, and variation across ￿rms in the strength of these tastes
induces variation in the marginal value of quality and thus ￿rms￿optimal
qualities. The authors estimate their models of cost and quality choice in
the nursing-care industry and ￿nd that quality is costly, with a 1.3% increase
in quality leading to a 10% increase in nursing-home costs.
Our study di⁄ers from theirs in three respects. First, we impose more
structure on (and estimate) hospital-level demand, while Gertler and Wald-
man (1992) impose more structure on (and estimate) a model of quality
choice by hospitals. Second, and more importantly, we are concerned with
unobserved productivity di⁄erences among ￿rms. Finally, we assess the im-
portance of clinical quality for revealed quality by comparing the costs of
each.
While our particular application is to hospital care in greater Los Angeles,
we believe that our analytical framework can contribute more broadly to
understanding the cost structure of ￿rms in di⁄erentiated-product industries
when quality and productivity are heterogeneous and di¢ cult to observe.
Recent studies that share this concern about unobserved productivity include
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2006), with the latter focusing
4on the costs of alcohol-abuse treatment.2
2 A Framework for Analyzing Hospital Qual-
ity and Costs
Researchers confront two challenges in investigating the cost of quality in
the hospital-services industry. First, hospital quality is di¢ cult to measure.
We use existing methods for analyzing consumer choices among di⁄erentiated
products with unobserved attributes, together with data on hospital choice,
to infer quality from the revealed preference of patients. Second, a hospital
may exercise discretion over its quality according to factors that researchers
do not observe, particularly productivity. We motivate this concern with
a model of quality choice by hospitals and explain an identi￿cation strategy
that exploits variation in the responsiveness of hospital demand to quality.
2.1 Quality and hospital choice by patients
We assume that a patient is informed about hospital characteristics and
chooses the hospital that maximizes her utility. The assumption that pa-
tients exercise choice over hospitals might be doubted, insofar as a patient
must be admitted to a hospital by her doctor. Yet nearly half of patients
maintain that they, not their doctors, choose their hospital (Wolinksy and
Kurz (1984)). In addition, Burns and Wholey (1992) concluded that, while a
patient is more likely to receive care at a hospital that is close to her doctor￿ s
o¢ ce, the patient is still in￿ uential in hospital choice. This evidence is con-
sistent with the view that hospitals compete for doctors through a "medical
arms race" in quality (Phelps (2002)), with patients choosing their doctors
in turn. In addition, hospitals refer patients to physicians with admitting
privileges (Gray (1986)).
Empirical evidence also supports the view that patients are informed
about and value a hospital￿ s clinical quality. For a variety of medical diag-
noses and procedures, Luft et al. (1990) found that patients in three Califor-
nia hospital markets in 1983 were more likely to receive care at hospitals with
favorable health outcomes (mortality and complications) and other clinical
2For a review of alternative approaches to the analysis of productivity itself, see Van
Biesebroeck (2004).
5quality indicators. The authors suggested that lay referral networks may
have been useful sources of information about clinical quality during the pe-
riod studied, when hospital-level outcomes were not publicly reported. When
the state of New York began to report cardiac mortality rates in the early
1990s, the market shares of hospitals with low rates grew (Mukamel and
Mushlin (1998)). More recently, Geweke et al. (2003) have found that hos-
pitals with high clinical quality (again measured by mortality) tend to treat
pneumonia patients whose illness is relatively (and unobservably) severe.3
There is also reason to believe that patients are informed about amenities.
Hospitals promote themselves on the basis of the availability of gourmet food
and weekend surgeries (Gray (1986)), and market analysts have found that
patients care about cleanliness and similar aspects of the hospital experience
(Lane and Lindquist (1988)). Economic analyses of hospital choice and costs
have largely neglected amenities, likely because of the di¢ culty of measuring
them.4 Finally, the proximity of a patient￿ s home to a hospital, while not an
intrinsic hospital attribute, is nevertheless a kind of amenity. Such proximity,
which a researcher frequently can observe, has consistently been found to be
valued by patients.
Patient utility Uih is comprised of systematic and idiosyncratic utility,
denoted Uih and ￿ih, respectively:
Uih = Uih + ￿ih = ￿d;iDih + ￿p;iPih + ￿x;iXh + ￿￿;i￿h + ￿ih; (1)
in which Dih is the distance between patient i￿ s home and hospital h (i.e.,
the converse of proximity); Pih is the patient￿ s price for the hospital￿ s care;
Xh is a vector of hospital attributes that both the patient and researcher
observe; and ￿h is a vector of attributes that only the patient observes. If the







, then equation 1 can be rewritten
as follows:
Uih = ￿d;iDih + ￿p;iPih + ￿x;iXh + ￿q;iQh + ￿ih; Qh = ￿
￿1
q;i￿￿;i￿h (2)
3Town and Vistnes (2001), Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Tay (2003) present further
evidence that patients value hospital quality.
4The number of nurses per bed, which Tay (2003) considers, contribute to amenities
but also to clinical quality. The analysis of hospital choice in Town and Vistnes (2001)
includes hospital-level indicator variables that may embody amenities (as we do), yet
quality is not the focus of their study.
6in which Qh is a latent index of quality.
Intuitively, this index of quality that the research does not observer is
revealed by the preferences of patients over hospitals that di⁄er in their
distances from home. Consider two hospitals whose observed attributes
are identical but whose locations di⁄er. If patients in an area favor the
hospital that is farther away over the closer hospital, utility can be higher
at the farther hospital only because its Qh is greater. Table 1 describes the
behavior of the patients we study (described in section 3.1). Only 40.6% of
patients chose the nearest hospital, and slightly more than a third of patients
did not choose one of the three nearest hospitals. This behavior suggests
that our approach to inferring quality can succeed.
The quality index Qh is similar to the unobserved product attribute
frequently included in di⁄erentiated-products discrete-choice models (Berry
et al. (1995)). Under either approach, the level of an unobservable cannot
be disentangled from the taste for it. When consumers may have hetero-





￿ (￿Qh), and so the parameter ￿q;i must be normalized for some
consumer. Harris and Keane (1998) and Harris et al. (2002) also allow for
variation in tastes. These studies use stated preferences for unobserved at-
tributes, while we use data on patient characteristics. Our approach cannot
distinguish among the components of Qh yet relies on data that is more
widely available.
The potential variability of tastes across patients in equation 2 is impor-
tant for several reasons. First, this variability can help clarify the identi￿ca-
tion of hospital demand. Suppose that tastes for the jth hospital attribute
depend on observed and unobserved patient characteristics ￿ denoted Ki
and ￿ij, respectively ￿ as follows: ￿j;i = ￿jKi+￿j;i For concreteness, con-
sider the assumption that the taste for Qh depends on observed comorbidities
and unobserved health status. Then equation 1 becomes:
Uih = ￿d;iDih + ￿x;iXh + ￿qKiQh + f￿q;iQh + ￿ihg; (3)
in which the model￿ s composite disturbance appears in braces. In order to
recover demand in our model, all observables in equation 3 must be distrib-
uted independently of ￿q;iQh. This would not be the case if unobservably
healthy or sick patients chose where to live based on the quality of hospitals.
An assumption that unobserved tastes are distributed with mean zero and
independently of all observables is su¢ cient for identi￿cation of the demand
7parameters. Ideally, this assumption could be empirically assessed, yet we
are not aware of a means of doing so. In our opinion, this assumption, which
is typically maintained in studies of hospital choice, is not unreasonable.
Second, variability in the taste for Qh is one source of heterogeneity in the
responsiveness of hospital demand to quality. We assume in our empirical
analysis in section 3.1 that all potential patients elect to receive care at
some hospital; we also assume that idiosyncratic tastes are distributed type-
1 extreme-valued. Then the probability that the ith patient chooses the jth
hospital takes the following form (McFadden (1974)):











The derivative of demand with respect to Qh ￿ which we term "quality





i ￿q;i￿ih (1 ￿ ￿ih) > 0 (6)
Because patients prefer hospitals that are located near their homes, a
hospital￿ s demand will increase more with Qh when patients near the hospital
have a stronger taste for quality, that is, a larger ￿q;i. In addition, the tastes
for both distance and quality indirectly a⁄ect quality responsiveness through
￿ih. We would expect quality responsiveness to be greater when the marginal
rate of substitution between distance and quality is high. Finally, variation in
the geographic distribution of patients (i.e., in the number of patients near
particular hospitals) a⁄ects the average level of ￿ih at a hospital, creating
additional variation in quality responsiveness. This variation is central to
our strategy, discussed in the next section, for distinguishing the contribution
of quality to costs from that of productivity.
2.2 Quality choice by hospitals
In the context of production, it has long been recognized that ￿rms may
choose the levels of factor inputs based on heterogeneous productivity, in-
ducing a correlation between the independent variables and the disturbance
8in an empirical model of the production function (Marschak and Andrews,
Jr. (1944)). Because of the duality of production and costs, a similar prob-
lem applies to the cost function, as has also long been recognized (Nerlove
(1965)). We argue here that di⁄erences in unobserved productivity across
hospitals can lead to di⁄erences in quality and then describe a strategy for
recovering the true cost of quality.
We assume that a hospital produces an output whose quality may be
represented by an index. Moreover, the price of hospital output is ￿xed.
For the Medicare fee-for-service patients we study, prices are regulated, and
hospitals cannot compete in prices. We also assume that productivity is
￿xed, at least during a time frame within which quality is variable.
The hospital￿ s problem is thus to choose quality to maximize utility. Util-
ity depends on expected pro￿ts ￿ and, perhaps, quality Q as follows5:
U = ￿ + ￿Q (7)
Because patients bene￿t from quality, the interpretation of ￿ > 0 is that
the hospital is altruistic, much as in Newhouse (1970) and Lakdawalla and
Philipson (2006). Even if ￿ = 0, utility depends indirectly on quality through






￿ C (Y;Q;Z;A;W) (8)
in which Y (￿) is expected hospital output/demand, Q￿ is a vector of com-
petitors￿qualities, X is a vector of demand shifters, C (￿) is cost, Z is a vector
of cost factors, A is productivity, and W is a vector of input prices. The role
(if any) of the regulated price in demand has been suppressed in equation 8
for expositional simplicity.
Productivity is distinct from all other determinants of costs in equation
8 and, in particular, from medical technologies and amenities that alter both
quality and costs. This treatment is broadly consistent with analyses that
compare outcomes and expenditures across areas (Skinner et al. (2006)). We
have suggested that hospital governance and management in￿ uence produc-
tivity. Under this view, productivity is especially hard for a researcher to
observe.
In choosing quality, a hospital obtains the following marginal utility:
UQ = (P ￿ CY)YQ + ￿ ￿ CQ (9)
5For the sake of expositional simplicity, we assume that the non-distribution constraint
on a not-for-pro￿t hospital does not bind.
9The ￿rst term in equation 9 is a demand e⁄ect, according to which higher
quality draws additional patients, increasing pro￿ts when P > CY. Mar-
ginal utility is also comprised of the bene￿t of any warm glow and the direct
￿nancial cost of quality. These margins cancel at an optimum. Under some
regularity conditions, a unique solution to the utility-maximization prob-
lem exists, and a hospital￿ s optimal quality and realized level of demand







The relationships between optimal quality and realized demand, on the











A ￿ 0 (10b)
In this model, higher productivity can raise the marginal utility of qual-
ity, both directly and indirectly. Marginal utility (and hence quality) in-
creases directly when the marginal cost of quality decreases with produc-
tivity (CQA < 0). It decreases indirectly when the marginal cost of output
decreases with productivity (CY A < 0), and demand increases with quality
(consistent with the evidence reviewed in the preceding section). Intuitively,
a hospital that can supply quality relative cheaply chooses to supply relatively
high quality. By equation 10b, if quality increases, so must output.
Figure 1 illustrates an important implication of this model for the empiri-
cal analysis of the quality-cost relationship. The true quality-cost curves of a
more and less productive hospital appear in the ￿gure; these curves condition
on all other determinants of costs. Our aim is to measure the rate at which
costs at either hospital increases with its quality. When the observed data
is ￿t by least squares, the true cost of quality is understated. The reason is
that hospitals that tend to choose high quality also tend to be low-cost.
If this model is correct, the cost of quality can be identi￿ed with variation
in quality that is unrelated to productivity. Our approach appeals to the
model for additional determinants of hospital quality. Features of hospital
demand are promising candidates, as these features can be inferred from the
model of hospital choice in the preceding section. Kessler and McClellan
(2000) take a similar approach in analyzing the impact of competition on
hospital expenditures and outcomes; Gaynor and Vogt (2003) use demand
to instrument for price in their analysis of hospital mergers and competitive
10outcomes. In the context of production with unobserved productivity, Olley
and Pakes (1996) appeal to a model of investment in their study of the
telecom industry.
In our case, the marginal utility of quality in equation 9 turns on the
responsiveness of hospital demand to quality, i.e., to YQ. This aspect of
hospital demand ￿ which we term "quality responsiveness" ￿ depends on
patient tastes for quality and distance, as well as market size (see equation








Intuitively, patients "pay for" quality through the demand e⁄ect, that is, the
￿rst term in equation 9. If a hospital￿ s demand is relatively responsive (YQXj
is positive and large), many patients will switch to the hospital in response
to an increase in quality. A hospital reacts to this high return by supplying
high quality, so long as marginal patients are pro￿table (P ￿ CY > 0).
Our empirical analysis focuses on Medicare fee-for-service patients re-
ceiving care for pneumonia. There is some evidence that reimbursement
for pneumonia care does not fully covers costs (Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (2005)). Yet quality for these patients may be a good measure
of quality for more pro￿table patients. If so, quality as revealed by pneu-
monia patients should increase with the responsiveness of demand among
pneumonia patients to hospital quality; we investigate this hypothesis below.
We also consider heart-attack care, which is relatively pro￿table (Horwitz
(2005), Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (2005)).
Quality responsiveness may vary across hospitals within greater Los An-
geles. Patients prefer hospitals close to home, implying that hospitals
within this large market tend to compete in localized submarkets. Table
2 demonstrates that patients residing near the hospitals we study do di⁄er in
socio-demographic characteristics plausibly related to tastes for quality and
distance. For example, the coe¢ cient of variation across hospitals in the
percentage of pneumonia patients residing within 2.5 miles who were black
is 1.98, while that for average income is 0.22. There is also considerable
variation in the number of patients residing near hospitals￿ the coe¢ cient of
variation is 0.58 at a distance of 2.5 miles.
The validity of quality responsiveness as an instrument requires that it
be uncorrelated with productivity. Drawing on the results from the model
of hospital choice, the response to quality within a market depends on actual





. Under the model, variation
in quality responsiveness is generally indirectly correlated with productivity
through the latter￿ s impact on actual quality. Potentially exogenous varia-
tion in quality responsiveness can be obtained by purging quality responsive
of actual quality, which can be achieved by ￿xing quality throughout the
market at some uniform level Q.
Quality responsiveness and productivity could be correlated for other
reasons. For example, patients with a strong taste for quality could reside
near hospitals that are well-managed. Sicker patients may choose to live
near high-quality hospitals, which tend to be more productive under the
model. We cannot rule out such hypotheses without information on hospital
productivity, the lack of which is precisely the problem that we face.
The framework just presented circumvents this problem on the basis of
models of patient and hospital behavior. Any empirical analysis is necessarily
based on some maintained assumptions, and a virtue of our framework is that
its structure is transparent (Reiss and Wolak (2005)).
3 Empirical Approach
In this section we explain our empirical approach, ￿rst to inferring hospital
quality from the revealed preference of hospital patients, then to assessing the
joint contribution of quality and productivity to hospital costs, and ￿nally to
distinguishing the contribution of quality to costs from that of productivity.
3.1 Hospital choice
We analyze choice among elderly Medicare patients who received care for
pneumonia at a hospital in greater Los Angeles in 2002. The hospital choices
and characteristics of these patients are disclosed in a data set on hospital
discharges compiled annually by the California O¢ ce of Statewide Health
Planning and Development (OSHPD).6 In the remainder of this section, we
motivate our focus on this context while describing our empirical analysis of
hospital choice.
Pneumonia care is sensible for our purposes. As we noted in section 2.1,
there is persuasive evidence that patients view hospitals as di⁄erentiated in
6http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/
12clinical quality for a variety of conditions, including pneumonia. In addi-
tion, pneumonia patients plausibly exercise considerable discretion over the
hospital at which care is received. In a sensitivity analysis we also consider
hospital choice among heart-attack patients.7
Our de￿nition of the greater Los Angeles hospital market begins with
general acute-care hospitals located in the ￿ve counties comprising the Los
Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. In exploratory analysis
we found that hospitals at the geographic extremes of this metropolitan area
tended to have implausibly extreme quality. We therefore exclude hospitals
in the Ventura and Palm Springs hospital referral regions from our benchmark
de￿nition of the market (Dartmouth Medical School, The Center for the
Evaluative Clinical Sciences (1998)). In addition, we exclude some remote
hospitals. We also exclude 12 Kaiser Permanente hospitals, which belong to
an integrated delivery system to which access may be limited.
Figure 2 illustrates the 129 hospitals in greater Los Angeles chosen in
2002 by at least one patient in our benchmark pneumonia sample (described
below). This market de￿nition is generally broader than that of Geweke
et al. (2003), who analyze hospitals in Los Angeles County that averaged
at least 20 pneumonia admissions per year. In a sensitivity analysis, we
consider this latter de￿nition. We also consider all hospitals in the metro
area￿ s ￿ve counties.
We analyze hospital choice among Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) patients
who resided in the ￿ve metropolitan counties, who were admitted from home,
and who were aged 65 or older. We focus on FFS patients because Medicare
HMOs may limit bene￿ciary choice, as Tay (2003) has noted. We consider
patients admitted from home for two reasons. First, the zip code of a
patient￿ s home is generally known in the discharge data, and so the distance
between home and hospital is also known. Second, the choice problem
facing patients admitted from nursing homes or other settings is susceptible
to misspeci￿cation with the information available (Geweke et al. (2003)).8
Medicare bene￿ciaries under age 65 are few in number and unrepresentative,
7Patients with each condition are identi￿ed in the discharge data on the basis of ICD9
codes. In particular, the principal diagnosis of a pneumonia patient begins with the
numbers 481, 482, 485, 486 or 4838, while that of a heart-attack patient begins with 410.
8Indeed, a lack of information about the source of admission (e.g., from home) moti-
vated Tay (2003)￿ s use of a mixed-logit analysis for hospital choice among heart-attack
patients. One "type" of patient was found to obtain relatively little disutility from dis-
tance, a ￿nding that is interpreted as absence from home when the heart attack occurred.
13with end-stage renal diseases being a source of eligibility.
We exclude patients whose age, sex or race was censored (for privacy
reasons) in the discharge data, because these characteristics are plausibly
related to tastes (Geweke et al. (2003), Tay (2003)). In our benchmark
sample, we also exclude patients whose nearest hospital is not in the greater
LA market.
Our benchmark sample of 9,006 pneumonia patients is summarized in
Table 3. Nearly three-quarters were aged 75 or older; slightly more than
half were female; and nearly eight percent were black. We estimate patients￿
household income based on Census information, closely following Geweke
et al. (2003)￿ s approach.9 Finally, the Charlson-Deyo index is a measure of
comorbidities as recorded in the discharge record (Quan et al. (2005)).
Our empirical model of the utility that a patient expects to receive from
a hospital is as follows:
Uih = ￿diDih + ￿qi
X
h0 Qh0I (h
0 = h) + ￿ih; (12)
in which Dih is the distance between the patient￿ s home and the hospital,
Qh is revealed quality, and I (￿) is an indicator function equaling one when a
statement is true and zero otherwise.
The term Qh embodies all aspects of the hospital experience that pa-
tients are aware of and value (see section 2.1). We refer to Qh as "revealed
quality" in order to distinguish it from its component attributes.10 Rele-
9We ￿rst match the ￿ve-digit zip code of a patient￿ s home to the ￿ve-digit Zip Code
Tabulation Area (ZCTA) de￿ned by the Census to approximate U.S. Postal Service zip
codes. Where there is no match, we match the patient to the ZCTA whose centroid is
nearest to the centroid of her USPS zip code. We then estimate average income among
black and non-black households headed by persons aged 65-74 and 75 or older within
the ZCTA. The Census reports the number of households within income intervals (e.g.,
$35,000 to $39,999), and we use the midpoint of each bounded interval (and a value of
$280,000 for the unbounded highest-income interval) to compute an average. When there
are no black households within the ZCTA, we use the average income among all racial
groups.
10This approach aggregates all hospital attributes into revealed quality. Comparing
equations 12 and 1, such aggregation is valid if the marginal rate of substitution between
any two attributes embodied in revealed quality is identical across patients. While we
are not aware of any direct evidence on this issue, this is a seemingly strong assumption.
This assumption can be tested and relaxed when a researcher observes some potential
components of quality. In the context of health-plan choice, Harris and Keane (1998)
and Harris et al. (2002) use stated-preference data to infer unobserved attributes while
accounting for observed attributes.
14vant attributes include clinical quality as well as amenities. This model of
choice behavior is consistent with the selective-referral hypothesis, in which
patients are more likely to choose hospitals with high clinical quality (Luft
et al. (1987)). An alternative explanation of the observed positive associa-
tion between hospital volume and favorable health outcomes is the hypothesis
that "practice makes perfect," for which there is some evidence (Gaynor et al.
(2005), Gowrisankaran et al. (2006)). Our model is also consistent with this
latter hypothesis, if patients form rational expectations about hospital vol-
umes and the clinical quality that results and choose hospitals accordingly.
Revealed quality may also embody "brand image," as distinct from "actual"
hospital attributes, due to advertising that is persuasive rather than infor-
mative (Bagwell (2007)). We discuss below why marketing expenditures are
unlikely to contribute signi￿cantly to the cost of revealed quality.
Motivated by existing evidence on the cost of clinical quality, we also ana-
lyze hospital choice with negative hospital mortality rates substituted for Qh
in equation 12. Lower mortality represents higher quality, and the use of neg-
ative mortality eases the comparison between revealed and clinical quality.
Annual risk-adjusted 30-day mortality rates for community-acquired pneu-
monia are averaged over the period 2000-2004 (California O¢ ce of Statewide
Health Planning and Development (2006)). OSHPD constructed these rates
by comparing the actual number of deaths for each hospital to the predicted
number based on patient characteristics, as in Morey et al. (1992) and Carey
and Burgess, Jr. (1999); the resulting ratio was then multiplied by the aver-
age actual mortality rate among California hospitals.11
In contrast with equation 1, this model does not include the price of
a hospital￿ s care. For a Medicare fee-for-service bene￿ciary, out-of-pocket
costs are essentially identical across hospitals (see, for example, Department
of Health and Human Services (2001)). Under the assumptions maintained
below, these costs do not in￿ uence the hospital choice of our patients. This
feature of the model is convenient, because hospital pricing is complex, and
important determinants of a patient￿ s price (such as insurance copayments
or anticipated writeo⁄s) are not observed. We are reluctant to model and
estimate prices, because their relationship to revealed quality is susceptible
to misspeci￿cation.
In the empirical model of utility, we allow the tastes for distance and
11OSHPD considers two risk-adjustment models. We use the mortality rate that ac-
counts for do-not-resuscitate orders.
15quality to di⁄er across patients as follows:
￿x;i = ￿x;0 + ￿x;75+yearsI (Agei ￿ 75) + ￿x;FemaleI (Sexi = Female)
+ ￿x;BlackI (Racei = Black) + ￿x;IncomeIncomei + ￿x;CDICDIi; x = d;q;
in which CDIi is the Charlson-Deyo index for the ith patient. Because
quality is latent (see section 2.1), the taste for revealed quality must be
normalized; we ￿x the intercept at one (￿q;0 = 1). This normalization
implies that quality as revealed by patients cannot be compared in levels
across speci￿cations.
In order to derive the likelihood that a patient is observed to choose a
hospital, some additional assumptions are necessary. First, patients in need
of care always elect to receive care, meaning that there is no "outside" good.
This assumption is particularly plausible for heart-attack patients. Second,
￿ih is assumed to be distributed type-I extreme-valued. Then the probability













h0 Qh0I (h0 = h00)
￿ (13)
A hospital￿ s expected demand follows immediately: Yh =
P
i ￿ih.
Revealed quality is measured with sampling variability in the subsequent
analysis of hospital costs. We obtain bootstrapped revealed-quality esti-
mates by reestimating the choice model on 100 samples of patients drawn
(with replacement) from the original sample. To speed up bootstrapping,
the analysis restricts each patient￿ s choice set in equation 13 to her nearest
50 hospitals, as Tay (2003) does. (We also consider choice sets that include
hospitals located within 20 and 50 miles of the patient￿ s home.) In addition,
we limit the analysis to patient choice within a single year (2002).
We estimate the model￿ s parameters, including each hospital￿ s revealed
quality Qh, by maximizing the joint likelihood of patients￿observed choices.
As is typical in discrete-choice models with unobserved product attributes,
a normalization is necessary on the revealed quality of some hospital (Berry
et al. (1995), Town and Vistnes (2001)).12
12The quality of Beverly Hospital is normalized to zero.
163.2 Hospital costs
We analyze hospital costs by specifying a translog cost function and esti-
mating this model over multiple years. The translog is a ￿ exible functional
form consistent with cost-minimizing behavior (Christensen et al. (1973)); it
has been used to study the cost structures of a wide variety of ￿rms, includ-
ing hospitals.13 Our benchmark analysis is a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression of the
relationship between costs and quality as revealed by pneumonia patients.
Our empirical approach to hospital costs rests on two important assump-
tions. The ￿rst assumption is that productivity is additively separable from
all other determinants of costs. That is, productivity di⁄erences shift the
hospital￿ s production frontier proportionally, with a neutral impact on inputs
(Van Biesebroeck (2004)).14 This assumption, which has been widely main-
tained in productivity-related empirical analyses, is essential for our purposes
because productivity is unobserved.
The second assumption is that hospital productivity is ￿xed in the short
run. This assumption implies that a ￿xed e⁄ect in each hospital￿ s costs
embodies its unobserved productivity, eliminating a potential source of cor-
relation between the model disturbance and observed determinants of costs.
The sensitivity of the results to this assumption can be assessed by analyzing
costs over an abbreviated horizon, as described below. We further assume
that hospital quality is ￿xed.15 This assumption is not essential but is con-
sistent with the analysis of hospital choice, in which quality is revealed by
patient choice in a single year (2002). Under this approach, productivity
and quality are a stable component of hospital costs over time.
Given these assumptions, hospitals produce quantity and quality accord-
ing to the transformation function:
F (Yht;Qh;Zht;Ah) = 0 (14)
13Cowing and Holtmann (1983), Zuckerman et al. (1994), and Dor and Farley (1996)
are just a few applications of the translog to hospital costs.
14This assumption implies, by Shepherd￿ s lemma, that factor shares do not vary with
productivity. We do not analyze factor shares here.
The assumption also implies that productivity is e⁄ectively one-dimensional. Pro-
ductivity is typically treated as one-dimensional in empirical analyses (Van Biesebroeck
(2004)).
15The assumption that quality is ￿xed does not necessarily follow from the assumption
that productivity is ￿xed. For example, demand conditions may change over time, leading
to changes in optimal quality.
17in which Yht is quantity at hospital h in year t, Qh is quality, Zht is a vector of
observed "cost factors," and Ah is productivity. Quantity is one-dimensional
in this model. Feldstein (1965) and Lave and Lave (1970) long ago recognized
the challenge of aggregating heterogeneous hospital stays; we describe our
approach to this problem below.16
The solution to the hospital￿ s cost-minimization problem gives the cost
function:
Cht = C (Yht;Qh;Zht;Ah;Wht);
in which Wht is a vector of input prices. This function is assumed to be
translog:
lnCht = ￿0 + ￿Y lnYht + ￿QQh +
X
j ￿Zj lnZhtj (15)
+
X
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The negative sign preceding Ah in equation 15 re￿ ects the fact that higher
productivity lowers costs. In particular, higher productivity lowers the mar-
ginal cost of both quantity and quality, implying under the model of hospital
behavior in section 2.2 that quality should be positively correlated with pro-
ductivity. The cost analysis does not, however, place any structure on the
relationship between quality and productivity, and we can and do test the
model￿ s prediction. The lack of interactions between productivity and other
16Quality is also one-dimensional here. Insofar as revealed quality embodies multiple at-
tributes, aggregation requires restrictions on technology (Spady and Friedlaender (1978)).
For example, the ratio of the marginal costs of any two attributes of revealed quality is
independent of input prices.
18factors in equation 15 follows from the assumption that productivity is sep-
arable. Productivity and quality appear in levels rather than logs because
these variables may take negative values. Hence this model measures the
cost of quality in percentage terms.
In our benchmark analysis, we consider total costs, which include capital
as well as operating costs. Like McClellan and Newhouse (1997) and Picone
et al. (2003), we measure hospital costs by applying a hospital￿ s cost-to-
charge ratio in each year to its charges in the same year. These ratios are
available from the annual cost reports that hospitals ￿le with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).17 We have been able to obtain a
hospital-level cost-to-charge ratio for at least one year for all but 3 of the 129
hospitals chosen by patients in the benchmark pneumonia choice analysis.
In a sensitivity analysis, we relax the assumption that a hospital￿ s capac-
ity minimizes its costs. Some have argued that the industry may not be
in long-run equilibrium (Carey and Burgess, Jr. (1999), Carey (2000)), and
so we analyze short-run costs. We exclude capital costs from this analysis
by applying the operating cost-to-charge ratios reported to CMS. In addi-
tion, the number of hospital beds is included as a cost factor in equation 15.
OSHPD generally reports the number of licensed general acute-care beds at
each hospital in each year. This analysis may ignore some aspects of hospital
quality, including any inputs that are either di¢ cult to adjust in the short
run or otherwise correlated with beds.
Hospital quantity Yht includes all inpatient stays, not just pneumonia
stays. Like Carey and Burgess, Jr. (1999), we account for heterogeneity
in these stays with an index of the annual mix of a hospital￿ s cases in each
year, obtained from OSHPD. This case-mix index (denoted CMI) re￿ ects the
relative resource intensivity of di⁄erent stays classi￿ed according to hundreds
of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).18 We include the mean Charlson-Deyo
index (denoted CDI) among all of a hospital￿ s stays in each year as another
17The discharge data containing charges is reported on a calendar-year basis. The CMS
data is reported for a hospital￿ s ￿scal year, which typically coincides with the federal ￿scal
year beginning October 1. The synchronization of charges and cost-to-charge ratios is
therefore "o⁄," often by three months. We view this problem as insigni￿cant and do not
attempt to correct for it.
18Examples of DRGs include simple pneumonia and pleurisy among 17+ year olds,
without complications; the same, but with complications; percutaneous coronary proce-
dures with acute myocardial infarction (AMI); and vaginal delivery without complicating
diagnoses.
19cost factor. This index measures patient comorbidities and hence health
status.
In the benchmark speci￿cation, quality as revealed by pneumonia patients
serves as a proxy for all hospital patients. In a sensitivity analysis we focus
on pneumonia care, excluding all non-pneumonia stays from Yht and de￿ning
costs accordingly. This analysis may not su⁄er from measurement error yet
precludes economies of scale and scope between pneumonia and other kinds
of care. We also analyze the cost of revealed heart-attack quality. Quality
as revealed by heart-attack patients may re￿ ect a di⁄erent mix of clinical
quality and amenities. Thus "revealed heart-attack quality" may be better
(or worse) than "revealed pneumonia quality" as a proxy of quality for all
patients.
Input prices also a⁄ect costs. We are concerned that heterogeneity in
inputs is hard to measure and related to quality. This concern is reinforced
by the evidence in Hendricks (1989) that the mix of employees at a hospital,
and in particular the share of better paid (and more highly skilled) employees,
explains some of the wage "gradient" across hospitals within urban areas. We
believe it is reasonable to assume that the hospitals studied, which operate
in a geographically small and seemingly homogenous market, face identical
prices for identical inputs. This assumption is consistent with Hendricks
(1989)￿ s ￿nding that hospital wages in central cities are indistinguishable
from wages in urbanized suburbs, after controlling for observed determinants
of wages. If larger hospitals enjoy a greater degree of monopsony power in
input markets (Sullivan (1989)), such a cost advantage will manifest itself
as scale economies, which are not our concern. We make the additional
assumption that prices evolve at a common rate during the period studied.
Input prices are then:
lnWhtj = ￿j + ￿tt (16)
in which j indexes the jth input and which t is time. We measure time
relative to the year 2002 (i.e., year 2002 is time 0).
With costs changing over time according to the rate of factor-price in￿ a-
20tion, costs become:
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in which the hospital￿ s "cost ￿xed e⁄ect" ￿h is:





h ￿ Ah (18)
Under the assumption that both quality and productivity are ￿xed in the
short run, each contributes to this component of cost. That is, the cost of
quality is not identi￿ed in the ￿xed-e⁄ect cost model of equation 17. The
contribution of quality to costs is distinguished from that of productivity in
a subsequent stage of analysis described in section 3.3.
In our benchmark cost analysis, we estimate equation 17 for the period
2000-2004, a moderately lengthy window around the year in which hospital
choice is analyzed (2002). This analysis investigates the cost of revealed
quality among the hospitals chosen by patients in the benchmark pneumonia
choice analysis. This sample is described in Table 4. These hospitals are a
diverse group, with total annual charges ranging from $3.1 million to $3,208.6
million, total costs ranging from $1.5 million to $842.6 million, total stays
ranging from 124 to 53,060, and beds ranging from 17 to 1,357. Observations
are drawn quite evenly across years.
We explore the sensitivity of our ￿ndings to some alternative speci￿ca-
tions in addition to those already described. First, we relax the assump-
tion that productivity and quality are ￿xed during the period 2000-2004,
restricting the analysis to 2002-2003 instead. A state regulation mandating
minimum nurse/patient ratios was to take e⁄ect in 2004, potentially altering
both clinical quality and hospital amenities (Donaldson et al. (2005)). As a
result, revealed quality in 2002 ￿ the year in which hospital choice is studied
￿ may have di⁄ered from quality in 2004. Second, we analyze the cost of
21revealed quality among the sample of hospitals that corresponds to Geweke
et al. (2003)￿ s, namely, hospitals in Los Angeles County that treated at least
20 pneumonia patients per year on average.19
An issue for these analyses is that revealed quality is measured with sam-
pling error from the analysis of hospital choice. Conventional standard errors
will not re￿ ect this sampling error (Murphy and Topel (1986)). Valid stan-
dard errors can be computed with bootstrapped revealed-quality estimates,
as described in section 3.1.
Motivated by existing evidence on the cost of clinical quality, we also an-
alyze the cost of lower mortality among pneumonia patients. In particular,
following Carey and Burgess, Jr. (1999), we ￿rst consider annual mortality
rates (as described in the preceding section). Substituting equation 18 into
equation 17, we estimate a pooled version of the cost model, ￿rst by ordi-
nary least squares (OLS), then by instrumental variables (IV). Instruments
include one-year lagged mortality rates as well as their interactions with
all quality-interacting covariates (e.g., lagged mortality interacted with log
quantity). The IV analysis should deal with the problem of measurement
error in the annual rates; the instruments may nevertheless be correlated
with unobserved productivity. Standard errors are clustered on the hospital
in these regressions. We then estimate the ￿xed-e⁄ect model of equation
17, again by both OLS and IV. The hospital-level ￿xed e⁄ects now embody
average mortality during 2000-2004, as well as productivity. Instruments
include the exogenous responsiveness of hospital demand with respect to
average mortality ￿ as described in subsequent section 3.3 ￿ and its inter-
actions with quality-interacting covariates. OLS on average mortality may
su⁄er less from measurement error than OLS on annual mortality. The IV
analysis of average mortality may deal with the endogeneity of mortality.
In all of these analyses, variables are demeaned so that the ￿rst-order
parameters re￿ ect phenomena of interest at a hospital with mean charac-
teristics. For example, the "average" hospital experiences scale economies
(diseconomies) if and only if ￿Y < 1 (￿Y > 1). For consistency, we de-
mean all variables (other than time) relative to the sample of hospitals in the
benchmark pneumonia cost analysis.
19These hospitals are somewhat larger than the hospitals in the benchmark cost sample,
with average beds of 247.8 and 229.7, respectively.
223.3 The cost of quality
Understanding the cost of quality is the aim of this paper. The preceding
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Estimates of the ￿nal four parameters in equation 19 are available from the
cost model of equation 17.
In the ￿xed-e⁄ect analyses of revealed quality and average mortality, the
remaining parameters in equation 19 appear in the hospital cost ￿xed e⁄ect
￿h. We wish to decompose this e⁄ect:





h ￿ Ah (20)
Estimates of the dependent variable ￿h are available from the cost model. Es-
timates of revealed quality are available from the analysis of hospital choice,
while average mortality is observed.
Two challenges remain. First, we argued in section 2.2 that quality may
be related to unobserved productivity; this concern applies to both revealed
quality and mortality rates. A valid instrument is correlated with quality
but uncorrelated with productivity. We have argued that the derivative
of a hospital￿ s demand with respect to quality ￿ which we have referred
to as "quality responsiveness" ￿ a⁄ects the marginal utility of quality and
thus its optimal level. Yet quality responsiveness depends on quality and
is therefore generally correlated with productivity. To obtain an instru-
ment, we evaluate this derivative with quality ￿xed at a uniform level, i.e.,




, drawing on the results of the analyses of hospital
choice based on revealed quality as well as average pneumonia mortality.20
Having argued earlier that this feature of hospital demand is plausibly uncor-
related with productivity, we refer to this instrument as "exogenous quality
responsiveness." The strength of its relationship to quality is assessed based
on the following:
Qh = ￿0 + ￿qQ
IV
h + ￿h (21)
20Under the empirical choice model, the level at which quality is ￿xed is irrelevant.
23For the case of one endogenous variable, Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest
that a set of instruments has su¢ cient power if this ￿rst-stage regression￿ s F
statistic exceeds ten. We can use (QIV)2 as an additional instrument.
The second challenge concerns valid inference. To begin with, revealed
quality and hence the dependent variable in equation 20 are measured with
error from the choice analysis. In addition, for both revealed quality and
average mortality, the ￿xed-e⁄ect dependent variable is not consistent in the
number of hospitals but is unbiased, implying that the ￿nite-sample per-
formance of the estimator is of paramount importance (Wooldridge (2002)).
To obtain valid standard errors, we apply bootstrapped revealed-quality es-
timates ￿rst in the cost model and then in the decomposition of quality and
productivity.
3.4 Summary
Our empirical approach is comprised of three stages. In the ￿rst stage we
estimate revealed quality using a conditional-logit model of hospital choice.
Revealed quality embodies all aspects of the hospital experience that patients
value, including amenities and clinical quality. The benchmark analysis
focuses on pneumonia patients. In the second stage we estimate a translog
model of hospital costs over time with hospital-level ￿xed e⁄ects that embody
the joint contribution of revealed quality and productivity. The benchmark
speci￿cation analyzes the total costs of all hospital stays during the period
2000-2004. In the third stage we regress the cost ￿xed e⁄ects from the second
stage on revealed quality from the ￿rst stage, instrumenting for revealed
quality with a measure of the responsiveness of hospital demand to quality.
Motivated by existing evidence on the cost of clinical quality, we compare
the cost of lower pneumonia mortality to the cost of revealed quality.
4 Findings
We now describe our ￿ndings from the analyses of hospital choice and costs.
We then present our evidence on the cost of quality in hospitals.
244.1 Hospital choice
The results of the analysis of hospital choice (described in section 3.1) ap-
pear in Table 5. The benchmark speci￿cation analyzes hospital choice by
pneumonia patients with a conditional-logit model which includes hospital
indicator variables for revealed quality. The ￿rst set (column) of results in
the table corresponds to this speci￿cation. We argued in section 3.1 that re-
vealed quality embodies both clinical quality and amenities. An alternative
speci￿cation replaces revealed quality with clinical quality, as measured by
negative mortality rates for community-acquired pneumonia. We use this
second set of results to compare the cost of clinical quality to that of revealed
quality in section 4.3.
The ￿t of the revealed-quality model is substantial, with a pseudo-R2 of
0.522. There is strong evidence that patients view hospitals as di⁄erentiated
in revealed quality. Observed and predicted hospital-level demand are essen-
tially perfectly correlated. When revealed quality is ignored (by evaluating
demand at zero quality for every hospital), this correlation declines to 0.411.
A kernel density estimate of the distribution of revealed quality appears
in Figure 3, and Table 6 lists the top and bottom 12 hospitals. (The re-
vealed quality of all hospitals for this benchmark analysis is listed in Table
A1.) A comparison of quality as revealed by pneumonia patients to alter-
native quality measures is interesting. The National Research Corporation
(NRC) conducts market research on the health-care sector, undertaking con-
sumer surveys concerning various aspects of hospital performance. Table 7
compares the top-12 hospitals by revealed quality in 2002 with NRC￿ s as-
sessment of "Most preferred for all health needs" and "Best overall quality"
in Los Angeles in 2004. Our choice analysis excludes the ￿ve Kaiser Perma-
nente hospitals that topped NRC￿ s rankings while including Hoag Memorial,
which belongs to NRC￿ s Orange County market. Nevertheless, there is re-
markable agreement between our measure and NRC￿ s. Our 2 top hospitals
received Consumer Choice Awards as the top hospitals in Los Angeles and
Orange County. Moreover, only one of NRC￿ s top-12 hospitals does not
appear in our top 12.
Next, Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between revealed quality and
pneumonia mortality. This strength of this relationship is only moderate
(with a correlation coe¢ cient ￿ = ￿0:256), suggesting that patients per-
ceive important variation in aspects of the hospital experience distinct from
clinical quality, e.g., in amenities. In addition, the ￿gure may suggest the
25volume-outcome relationship, in which a high patient volume is associated
with favorable outcomes (Luft et al. (1987)). The revealed quality that
di⁄erentiates hospitals is highly correlated with the number of patients who
chose to receive pneumonia care at hospitals (￿ = +0:704). As we explained
in section 3.1, our choice model is consistent with both the selective referral
and "practice makes perfect" explanations of the volume-outcome relation-
ship. Nevertheless, the costs of quality and quantity may prove di¢ cult to
distinguish.
Figure 5 compares revealed quality among pneumonia patients to revealed
quality among heart-attack patients. Revealed quality is strongly correlated
among pneumonia and heart-attack patients; this correlation is positive and
fairly strong (￿ = +0:797). Nevertheless, heart-attack patients reveal some
hospitals to be substantially lower in quality than do pneumonia patients,
perhaps because these hospitals lack advanced technologies for cardiac care
(such as a catheterization lab).
In sensitivity analyses, we consider alternative treatments of choice behav-
ior, the market and patients￿choice sets. The correlations between revealed
quality in our benchmark pneumonia choice analysis and these alternatives
(as described in Table A2 of the appendix) exceed +0:97. This similarity in
revealed quality across alternative speci￿cations is reassuring.
Our model of hospital choice permits the tastes for distance and quality
to vary with patient characteristics. In the revealed-quality analysis, for
example, older patients have a relatively strong distaste for distance between
home and hospital, while higher-income and female patients have a relatively
weak distaste. With respect to quality, older, higher-income, and relatively
comorbid patients have a relatively strong taste, while there is some evidence
that blacks value quality less than others. Tastes for clinical quality, as
measured by negative mortality rates, also vary.
To aid in interpretation, Table 8 describes the willingness of di⁄erent
patients to travel for higher revealed quality. White males under age 75
with mean income and comorbidity would be willing to travel 2.88 miles far-
ther for a hospital at the 75th percentile of the revealed-quality distribution
rather than the 25th percentile (see Table A3 for these statistics). The same
patients, only older (aged 75+), would be willing to travel farther, namely,
3.88 miles. While older patients dislike distance more than younger patients,
their stronger preference for revealed quality dominates. The reference pa-
tients, only more a› uent (1 standard deviation above mean income), would
be willing to travel somewhat farther still (3.94 miles). At the other extreme,
26the reference patients, only black, would be willing to travel only 2.41 miles
for higher quality.
We argued in section 2.2 that such variation in patient tastes can create
variation in the responsiveness of hospital demand to quality and may there-
fore induce exogenous variation in hospital quality. We pursue this strategy
below in identifying the cost of quality.
4.2 Hospital costs
The benchmark cost analysis (described in section 3.2) is a translog model
of the total costs of all hospital stays during 2000-2004. This model, which
includes hospital-level ￿xed e⁄ects, has substantial explanatory power, with
an overall R2 of nearly eighty-two percent and a within-hospital R2 of nearly
forty-eight percent. The results of this analysis appear in Table A4.21
The cost model assumes that productivity and quality are stable in the
short run. There is strong evidence of a ￿xed component of hospital costs:
the p value of an F test of the hypothesis that all hospital ￿xed e⁄ects are
equal to zero is less than 0.001.
Some additional results are worth noting. We cannot reject constant
returns to scale22 At an average hospital, costs were increasing nearly ￿ve
percent per year in 2002, and the elasticity of costs with respect to case mix
was close to one (￿CMI = 0:889). The interaction between case mix and
quality is negative and statistically signi￿cant (￿Q;CMI = ￿0:563). As a
result, the elasticity of costs with respect to case mix is lower at hospitals
with higher revealed quality, and the cost of revealed quality (in percentage
terms) is lower at hospitals with more complex cases. We present evidence in
21At this juncture, the only standard errors a⁄ected by ￿rst-stage sampling variability
that have been bootstrapped are those for the cost of quality improvement in section 4.3.
22Carey (2000)￿ s analysis of costs in U.S. hospitals ￿nds scale diseconomies under a
random-e⁄ects speci￿cation but scale economies under ￿xed e⁄ects. This pattern is
consistent with a preference of patients for hospitals with high quality that the researcher
does not observe. Our choice analysis delivers strong evidence that patients view hospitals
in greater LA as di⁄erentiated in quality and choose accordingly. Nevertheless, a Hausman
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the results of a random-e⁄ects speci￿cation are
consistent for the results of a ￿xed-e⁄ects speci￿cation for our benchmark cost analysis
(Hausman (1978)). This failure to reject is consistent with a positive correlation between
quality and productivity among our hospitals, which we ￿nd in the next section. We do
￿nd a pattern similar to Carey￿ s in some sensitivity analyses (e.g., of hospital costs for
pneumonia care).
27the next section that amenities (rather than clinical quality) drive the cost
of revealed quality, and so this ￿nding suggests economies of scope in the
provision of amenities and complex care. The interaction between quantity
and quality (￿Y;Q = 0:082) cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
In the analysis of the cost of clinical quality, the results are quite impre-
cise when pneumonia mortality is interacted with itself and other covariates,
and these second-order parameters are restricted to be zero in the reported
speci￿cations. All other results are qualitatively similar to those for the
benchmark analysis of costs based on quality as revealed by pneumonia pa-
tients. The results from this analysis appear in Table A5.
4.3 The cost of quality
We ￿rst consider revealed quality. As Figure 6 illustrates, revealed quality
is increasing in the exogenous quality responsiveness of hospital demand,
consistent with our model of hospital behavior in section 2.2. The F statistic
for the power of this instrument exceeds the usual threshold, with the ￿rst-
stage regression appearing in Table A6.
We explore the source of our identi￿cation through this instrument by
regressing it on the mean characteristics of patients residing within 2.5 miles
of hospitals. The elasticities of exogenous quality responsiveness with respect
to these characteristics appear in Table 9. Income and the number of patients
are statistically signi￿cant, with elasticities of 1.08 and 0.41, respectively.
The percentages of patients who were aged 75 or older and who were female
were of marginal statistical signi￿cance, with respective elasticities of 0.34
and 0.30.
We use exogenous quality responsiveness as an instrument to decompose
the contributions of revealed quality and productivity to hospital costs. In an
exploratory analysis that included squared responsiveness as an instrument,
we found that the cost of quality was imprecisely estimated. We therefore
restrict the second-order parameter on quality (￿Q2) to be zero, as Gertler
and Waldman (1992) do.
Table 10 reports the results of this analysis. The cost of quality is
positive and statistically signi￿cant under both ordinary least squares (OLS)
and instrumental variables (IV). Yet the magnitude of this cost is greater
by more than fourfold under IV. A Hausman test rejects the null that the
OLS results are consistent for the IV results at a level of nearly four percent.
Based on the IV results, we ￿nd that productivity Ah is strongly correlated
28(￿ = +0:555) with revealed quality Qh, as our model of hospital behavior
predicts. Figure 7 illustrates this relationship.
Having decomposed the contributions of revealed quality and productiv-
ity, the cost of quality can be discerned. Table 11 indicates that an increase
in revealed quality from the 25th percentile of its distribution to the 75th
percentile would increase costs by 50.2% at the average hospital, with a boot-
strapped standard error of 16.6%.23 If we ignore the relationship between
productivity and quality and apply the OLS results, this quality improvement
would appear to increase costs by only 9.4%.
We also consider the sensitivity of this ￿nding to some alternative speci-
￿cations, with Table 11 summarizing these results. First, we analyze costs
for pneumonia patients only. The estimated cost of quality may be higher
under this speci￿cation if quality as revealed by pneumonia patients is an
imperfect measure of quality for other patients. The quality improvement
now increases costs by more than one hundred percent, although this esti-
mate is imprecise. Second, we relax the assumption that productivity and
revealed quality are ￿xed over ￿ve years, limiting our analysis to 2002-2003.
The cost of the quality improvement under this speci￿cation (+51.9%) is
similar to the benchmark result. Third, we relax the assumption that a hos-
pital￿ s capacity is cost-minimizing, analyzing short-run operating costs with
the number of beds in the model. The increase in costs is then smaller but
still substantial (+31.0%). This ￿nding suggests that aspects of the hospital
experience which are unrelated to the number of beds are important. In
particular, hospitals may have minimized the costs of those inputs to clinical
quality and amenities that are easier to adjust than (and uncorrelated with)
hospital beds.
Next, we consider the cost of quality within the market as de￿ned by
Geweke et al. (2003). The distribution of revealed quality di⁄ers between
the benchmark and this market de￿nition (see Tables A2 and A3). Based
on the interquartile range under this de￿nition, the cost of the improvement
in revealed quality is +38.4% at an average hospital.
This ￿nding may err in the direction of understating the cost of quality.
An alternative approach would transform the 25th and 75th percentiles of
revealed quality under the benchmark analysis into corresponding levels of















h is the pth percentile of the quality distribution. The reported standard error is
the standard deviation of the preceding percentage among bootstraps on ￿Q.
29revealed quality for the alternative market de￿nition by regressing the latter
on the former. Under this approach, costs would increase by 67.8% rather
than 38.4%.
Finally, we consider the cost of quality as revealed by heart-attack pa-
tients. The mix of clinical quality and amenities that comprise revealed
heart-attack quality may be more or less representative of quality for the
typical patient than is revealed pneumonia quality. Based on the distrib-
ution of revealed heart-attack quality, the cost of the quality improvement
for the average hospital is smaller (+25.1%.) than the benchmark result,
though this di⁄erence may be statistically insigni￿cant. Had we transformed
revealed pneumonia quality into revealed heart-attack quality as described
in the preceding paragraph, costs would increase by more (+41.4% versus
+25.1%). OLS again substantially understates the cost of quality (+9.8%
versus +25.1%). We also ￿nd that revealed quality increases in the exoge-
nous quality responsiveness of hospital demand among heart-attack patients
and that quality is positively correlated with productivity.
Having analyzed the cost of revealed quality, we turn to the cost of lower
pneumonia mortality. Table 11 also describes the cost of lowering mortality
from the 75th percentile of the distribution of average mortality during 2000-
2004 to the 25th percentile, that is, from 14.2% to 10.7%.24
We ￿rst analyze the cost of changes in annual mortality rates. The point
estimates suggest that lower mortality is costly, though this estimate cannot
be distinguished from zero (see speci￿cation 1 in Table A5). One possible
explanation is that measurement error in annual mortality rates leads to
attenuation bias. Carey and Burgess, Jr. (1999) ￿nd evidence of such bias,
although the lower mortality is associated with somewhat lower costs in
their analysis. We ￿nd that annual mortality rates are strongly related to
one-year lagged mortality (see Table A7). When we instrument for annual
mortality, the point estimate on quality (speci￿cation 2 in Table A5) increases
in magnitude. As a result, the cost of the hypothetical improvement in
pneumonia mortality rises from +1.6% to +6.2%.25 We again cannot reject
the hypothesis that costs are unchanged.
24Because this quality measure is not latent, we need not worry about changes in its
distribution across speci￿cations.
25Throughout the mortality analyses, the apparent cost of the quality improvement is
even smaller when we transform the 25th and 75th percentiles of revealed pneumonia
quality into predicted levels of pneumonia mortality based on a regression of the latter on
the former.
30We then consider the average mortality rate during 2000-2004. We es-
timate the ￿xed-e⁄ects cost model using this measure of quality. We then
decompose the contribution of lower mortality both by OLS and IV, with
exogenous quality responsiveness (with respect to average mortality) as an
instrument. Average mortality smooths some of the measurement error in
annual mortality, and the estimated cost of the hypothetical improvement
in pneumonia mortality is higher for average mortality with OLS than for
annual mortality with OLS, namely, 3.2% versus 1.6%. When we instru-
ment for annual mortality, this estimate more than doubles to 7.1%. These
estimates continue to be statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The cost of clinical quality appears to be modest in comparison to the
cost of revealed quality. This evidence suggests that aspects of the hospital
experience unrelated to clinical quality are an important driver of hospital
costs as well as choice. Investments in persuasive advertising, while po-
tentially contributing to brand image for hospitals, average only 0.1-0.2% of
revenues (Barro and Chu (2002)). Thus the evidence is consistent with the
view that hospitals di⁄erentiate themselves with costly investments in ameni-
ties such as caring and attentive sta⁄, good food, and pleasant surroundings
(Newhouse (1994)).
5 Conclusion
In clarifying the relationship between hospital quality and costs, we con-
fronted two signi￿cant challenges. Hospital quality is di¢ cult for a researcher
to measure. In addition, quality is potentially confounded with unobserved
productivity, in the sense that hospitals that are able to produce quality at
relatively low cost have an incentive to supply relatively high quality. Each
of these problems can make quality appear to be less costly than is truly the
case.
Our strategy for dealing with these problems exploits the observed behav-
ior of consumers in this industry. Patients are aware of clinical quality and
are plausibly informed about amenities, and so we inferred quality at hospi-
tals in greater Los Angeles from the revealed preference of patients. We then
recovered the joint contribution of quality and productivity to costs from lon-
gitudinal data on hospital costs. In order to distinguish the contribution of
quality, we again appealed to consumer behavior, arguing that di⁄erences in
patient tastes within localized hospital markets lead to exogenous variation
31in hospitals￿chosen qualities.
Our empirical ￿ndings suggest that the cost of quality as revealed by
patients is substantial. In our benchmark analysis, an improvement in re-
vealed quality from the 25th of its distribution to the 75th percentile would
increase costs by 50.2% at the average hospital, a result that is robust to
alternative speci￿cations. When, however, we did not instrument for qual-
ity, this hypothetical quality improvement would appear to increase costs by
only 9.4%.
Motivated by existing evidence on the cost of clinical quality, we also
analyzed the cost of an equivalent improvement in pneumonia mortality.
The cost of this quality improvement appears to be modest in comparison
to the cost of the improvement in revealed quality; we could not even reject
the hypothesis that lower pneumonia mortality is costless. This contrast
between the costs of clinical and revealed quality suggests that amenities
(such as caring, attentive sta⁄, good food, and pleasant surroundings) are
important determinants of hospital costs.
The present analysis suggests worthwhile directions for future research.
For example, by specifying and estimating an empirical model of quality
choice among hospitals, we could assess the distribution of costs in a coun-
terfactual world with no productivity di⁄erences. We could also investigate
the role of altruism in the hospital-care industry and, in particular, the re-
lationship between altruism and hospital ownership. More generally, we
believe that our approach holds promise for understanding the cost structure
of ￿rms in other di⁄erentiated-products industries.
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Figure 1:  
Least squares understates cost of quality if  
more productive hospital supplies higher quality Figure 2:   
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Figure 4:   
Revealed quality versus average 30-day risk-adjusted mortality rates  
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Figure 6: 
First-stage estimate of revealed quality on instrument for hospitals in greater LA 































































Mean distance to nearest hospital (miles) 1.2
Mean distance to chosen hospital 2.8
Nearest hospital chosen 40.6%
2nd nearest hospital chosen 15.1%
3rd nearest hospital chosen 9.5%
Any other hospital chosen 34.8%
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia sample.
Table 1:  Distance from Patient's Home and Hospital Choice
Characteristic 2.5 miles 10 miles
Percent 75+ years old 0.09 0.06
Percent female 0.09 0.04
Percent black 1.98 0.96
Mean income 0.22 0.13
Mean Charlson-Deyo index 0.12 0.07
Number of patients 0.58 0.47
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia sample.
Table 2:  Coefficient of Variation in Mean Characteristics              















Patient characteristic Mean SD Min Max
75+ years old 75.1% — — —
Female 57.1% — — —
Black 7.6% — — —
Income $43,930 $17,400 $5,000 $155,660
Charlson-Deyo index (CDI) 2.1 1.8 0 15
Number of patients
Number of hospitals
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia sample.
Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Hospital Patients
129
9008
Statistic Mean SD Min Max
Total annual gross charges (million $) 335.5 352.6 3.1 3208.6
Total annual costs (million $) 107.5 111.3 1.5 842.6
Total annual operating costs (million $) 97.2 101.0 1.4 757.2
Annual stays, total 11897 8999 124 53060
Annual stays, pneumonia only 337.6 196.0 2 1152
Mean Charlson-Deyo index (CDI), all stays 1.070 0.368 0.168 2.371
Mean Charlson-Deyo index (CDI), pneumonia only 1.711 0.365 0.565 3.800
Case-mix index (CMI), all stays 1.064 0.221 0.520 2.200
Licensed general acute-care beds 230.4 177.9 17 1357
Year 2000 20.1% — — —
Year 2001 19.9% — — —
Year 2002 20.4% — — —
Year 2003 20.1% — — —
Year 2004 19.4% — — —
Number of hospitals
Number of hospital-years
Table 4:  Summary Statistics for Hospitals                                              
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Hospital indicators Included Excluded
Number of patients 9008 8668
Number of hospitals 129 116
Log likelihood -16870.56 -18547.50
Pseudo R squared 0.522 0.454
Correlation of observed and predicted hospital demand 0.996 0.446
Correlation given uniform revealed quality / mortality  0.411 0.441
Mean elasticity of demand with respect to mortality — -0.50
over 2000-2004 and measured in percent.  The negative of mortality is analyzed, because lower 
mortality represents higher quality.  Coefficient on revealed quality is normalized to one for 
reference group, because revealed quality is latent.  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.  Mean elasticity is 
calculated with respect to the characteristics and predicted choice probabilities of each patient 
in the sample.
Quality*Black






















Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian 0.81 1
Cedars Sinai Medical Center 0.58 2
Torrance Memorial Medical Center 0.55 3
Huntington Memorial Hospital 0.45 4
Little Company Of Mary Hospital 0.41 5
St. John's Hospital & Health Center 0.24 6
Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center 0.21 7
UCLA Medical Center 0.21 8
Long Beach Memorial Medical Center 0.17 9
Glendale Adventist Medical Center - Wilson Terrace 0.10 10
Encino-Tarzana Regional Med Ctr-Encino 0.07 11
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital 0.00 12
USC University Hospitals -3.52 118
Orange County Community Hospitals -3.54 119
City Of Angels Medical Center-Downtown Campus -3.81 120
Hollywood Community Hospital Of Hollywood -4.09 121
City Of Hope National Medical Center -4.17 122
College Hospital Costa Mesa -4.28 123
Lac/Rancho Los Amigos National Rehab Center -4.45 124
Doctors Hospital Of West Covina, Inc -4.64 125
USC Kenneth Norris, Jr. Cancer Hospital -4.69 126
Parkview Community Hospital Medical Center -5.10 127
Lincoln Hospital Medical Center -5.70 128
Orthopaedic Hospital -6.30 129
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia choice analysis.




Most preferred for                          
all health needs
Best overall quality





Torrance Memorial Medical Center 3 6 5
Huntington Memorial Hospital 4 4 4
Little Company of Mary Hospital 5 12 11
Saint John's Health Center 6 12
Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center 7 11 9
UCLA Medical Center 8 2 2
Long Beach Memorial Medical Center 9 3 3
Glendale Adventist Medical Center 10
Encino-Tarzana Regional Medical Center 11
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital 12
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital 7 8
Kaiser Permanente — Baldwin Park Not in sample 9 10
Kaiser Permanente — Bellflower Not in sample 7
Kaiser Permanente — Harbor City Not in sample 8
Kaiser Permanente — Sunset Not in sample 5 6
Kaiser Permanente — West Los Angeles Not in sample 10
Notes:  Revealed quality is based on bechmark pneumonia choice analysis.  
aNRC is the National Research Corporation.  
bNRC Consumer Choice 
Award as top hospital in Los Angeles.
Table 7:  Rankings of Top-12 Hospitals by Revealed Quality and Survey Measures
NRC
a, 2004 Los Angeles Survey
Revealed quality, 2002 Hospital









  Characteristic Mean elasticity
Percent 75+ years old 0.34 (0.22)
Percent female 0.30 (0.20)
Percent black 0.01 (0.01)
Average income 1.06*** (0.09)
Average Charlson-Deyo index 0.09 (0.17)
Number of patients 0.41*** (0.04)
errors appear in parentheses.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.  Mean 
elasticities are computed at the sample means of the patient 
characteristics.
Table 9:  Elasticity of Quality Responsiveness (Q
IV) with 
Respect to Mean Characteristics of Patients Residing 
within 2.5 Miles of Hospitals 
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia choice analysis.  
Standard 
Type of patient Miles
White male under 75 years old with mean income and comorbidity 2.88 (0.07)
Black 2.41 (0.21)
Female 2.81 (0.12)
Comorbidity +1 standard deviation above mean 3.05 (0.10)
Age 75+ 3.85 (0.19)
Income +1 standard deviation above mean 3.94 (0.14)
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia choice analysis.  Income is measured by 
Table 8:  Willingness To Travel for Revealed Quality at 75th Percentile                 
of Distribution Rather than 25th Percentile
mean household income within zip code; comorbidity is measured by Charlson-Deyo 
index. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Baseline
Deviation from baseline 


















R squared 0.034 —
N
Hausman test of OLS vs. IV, p value
Correlation between quality (Q) and productivity (A) 0.000 0.555
and p value are not corrected for first-stage sampling variability.  * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
Table 10:  Decomposition of Revealed Quality and Productivity
Parameter (Standard Error)






Specification Percent change in costs
Revealed quality
OLS
Benchmark analysis +9.4% (7.1%)
IV
Benchmark analysis +50.2% (16.6%)
Pneumonia stays instead of all stays +159.6% (79.8%)
2002-2003 instead of 2000-2004 +51.9% (21.6%)
With short-run operating costs as dependent variable and hospital beds in model +31.0% (15.5%)
Sample consistent with Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) +38.4% (5.9%)







Interquartile improvement is an increase in revealed quality from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of its 
distribution and a decrease in the pneumonia mortality rate from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile of 
the distribution of average pneumonia mortality, 2000-2004.  Mortality rate is risk-adjusted 30-day mortality 
rate for community-acquired pneumonia.  Instrumental variable for annual mortality rate is one-year lagged 
mortality rate; instrumental variable for revealed quality/average mortality rate is derivative of hospital demand 
with respect to the quality measure, evaluated at uniform quality throughout market.  Standard errors appear in 
parentheses and are based on 100 bootstraps.  
Table 11:  Percentage Change in Cost at Average Hospital Due to                                                                           
an Interquartile Improvement in Hospital Quality
Notes:  Average hospital has mean characteristics relative to the benchmark pneumonia hospital sample.  
Average mortality rate, 2000-2004 
Table A1:  Revealed Quality 
Hospital  Revealed 
quality  Rank 
Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian  0.81  1 
Cedars Sinai Medical Center  0.58  2 
Torrance Memorial Medical Center  0.55  3 
Huntington Memorial Hospital  0.45  4 
Little Company Of Mary Hospital  0.41  5 
St. John's Hospital & Health Center  0.24  6 
Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center  0.21  7 
UCLA Medical Center  0.21  8 
Long Beach Memorial Medical Center  0.17  9 
Glendale Adventist Medical Center - Wilson Terrace  0.10  10 
Encino-Tarzana Regional Med Ctr-Encino  0.07  11 
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital  0.00  12 
Beverly Hospital  0.00  13 
Methodist Hospital Of Southern California  -0.02  14 
Santa Monica - Ucla Medical Center  -0.03  15 
Verdugo Hills Hospital  -0.06  16 
Sherman Oaks Hospital And Health Center  -0.07  17 
Encino-Tarzana Regional Med Ctr-Tarzana  -0.12  18 
Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital  -0.14  19 
Glendale Memorial Hospital & Health Center  -0.18  20 
Valley Presbyterian Hospital  -0.18  21 
Garfield Medical Center  -0.21  22 
St. Mary Medical Center  -0.21  23 
Centinela Hospital Medical Center  -0.22  24 
Little Company Of Mary Hosps-San Pedro, Torrance & Harbor City  -0.24  25 
Downey Regional Medical Center  -0.26  26 
Providence Holy Cross Medical Center  -0.29  27 
Daniel Freeman Memorial Hospital  -0.33  28 
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital  -0.36  29 
Alhambra Hospital  -0.37  30 
Pacific Hospitals Of Long Beach  -0.38  31 
St. Jude Medical Center  -0.39  32 
Century City Hospital  -0.40  33 
Granada Hills Community Hospital  -0.42  34 
Saddleback Memorial Medical Center  -0.44  35 
Good Samaritan Hospital-Los Angeles  -0.50  36 
Brotman Medical Center  -0.50  37 
Queen Of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Med Center  -0.53  38 
St. Francis Medical Center  -0.53  39 
San Gabriel Valley Medical Center  -0.56  40 
St. Joseph Hospital - Orange  -0.58  41 
Northridge Hospital Medical Center  -0.61  42 
Los Alamitos Medical Center  -0.65  43 
Citrus Valley Medical Center - Ic Campus  -0.66  44 
St. Vincent Medical Center  -0.69  45 West Hills Hospital & Medical Center  -0.69  46 
Pacific Alliance Medical Center, Inc.  -0.71  47 
Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center  -0.73  48 
Northridge Hospital Medical Center - Sherman Way  -0.78  49 
White Memorial Medical Center  -0.78  50 
Irvine Regional Hospital And Medical Center  -0.80  51 
Mission Community Hospitals  -0.82  52 
Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center  -0.87  53 
Midway Hospital Medical Center  -0.87  54 
Anaheim Memorial Medical Centers  -0.88  55 
Fountain Valley Rgnl Hosps & Med Ctrs  -0.88  56 
Foothill Presbyterian Hospital-Johnston Memorial  -0.91  57 
Community Hospital Of Long Beach  -1.01  58 
East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital  -1.03  59 
Citrus Valley Medical Center - Qv Campus  -1.05  60 
Memorial Hospital Of Gardena  -1.07  61 
Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center  -1.08  62 
Huntington Beach Hospital  -1.09  63 
San Antonio Community Hospital  -1.09  64 
West Anaheim Medical Center  -1.14  65 
Lakewood Regional Medical Center  -1.15  66 
Elastar Community Hospital  -1.16  67 
Bellflower Medical Center  -1.21  68 
Garden Grove Hospital & Medical Center  -1.21  69 
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center  -1.26  70 
Monterey Park Hospital  -1.27  71 
St. Bernardine Medical Center  -1.31  72 
Loma Linda University Medical Centers  -1.35  73 
Whittier Hospital Medical Center  -1.37  74 
Community Hospital Of Gardena  -1.37  75 
Chino Valley Medical Center  -1.37  76 
Moreno Valley Community Hospital  -1.42  77 
Coastal Communities Hospital  -1.46  78 
South Coast Medical Center  -1.48  79 
Redlands Community Hospital  -1.59  80 
San Clemente Hospital & Medical Center  -1.59  81 
Doctors' Hospital Medical Center Of Montclair  -1.61  82 
La Palma Intercommunity Hospital  -1.65  83 
Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital  -1.72  84 
Los Angeles County Olive View-Ucla Medical Center  -1.73  85 
Pacifica Hospital Of The Valley  -1.80  86 
University Of California Irvine Medical Center  -1.80  87 
Greater El Monte Community Hospital  -1.80  88 
East Valley Hospital Medical Center  -1.88  89 
California Hospital Medical Center - Los Angeles  -1.91  90 
Anaheim General Hospitals  -1.91  91 
Placentia Linda Hospital  -1.92  92 
Los Angeles Co Martin Luther King Jr/Drew Med Ctr  -1.93  93 
Monrovia Community Hospital  -1.94  94 Motion Picture & Television Hospital  -1.98  95 
Los Angeles Co Harbor-Ucla Medical Center  -2.02  96 
Suburban Medical Center  -2.05  97 
San Dimas Community Hospital  -2.05  98 
Western Medical Center Hospital - Anaheim  -2.06  99 
Community & Mission Hosps Of Hntg Pk  -2.12  100 
Western Medical Center - Santa Ana  -2.13  101 
Corona Regional Medical Centers  -2.18  102 
Santa Teresita Hospital  -2.39  103 
Riverside County Regional Medical Center  -2.41  104 
Community Hospital Of San Bernardino  -2.47  105 
Riverside Community Hospital  -2.48  106 
Norwalk Community Hospital  -2.51  107 
Chapman Medical Center  -2.60  108 
Los Angeles Community Hospital  -2.60  109 
Brea Community Hospital  -2.68  110 
Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center Inc  -2.88  111 
Temple Community Hospital  -2.88  112 
Los Angeles Metropolitan Medical Centers  -2.93  113 
St. Luke Medical Center  -3.03  114 
Tri-City Regional Medical Center  -3.18  115 
Los Angeles Co Usc Medical Center  -3.25  116 
Arrowhead Regional Medical Center  -3.31  117 
Usc University Hospitals  -3.52  118 
Orange County Community Hospitals  -3.54  119 
City Of Angels Medical Center-Downtown Campus  -3.81  120 
Hollywood Community Hospital Of Hollywood  -4.09  121 
City Of Hope National Medical Center  -4.17  122 
College Hospital Costa Mesa  -4.28  123 
Lac/Rancho Los Amigos National Rehab Center  -4.45  124 
Doctors Hospital Of West Covina, Inc  -4.64  125 
Usc Kenneth Norris, Jr. Cancer Hospital  -4.69  126 
Parkview Community Hospital Medical Center  -5.10  127 
Lincoln Hospital Medical Center  -5.70  128 
Orthopaedic Hospital  -6.30  129 











0.994 0.972 0.993 1.000
(129) (129) (129) (167)
0.974 0.957 0.968 0.826 1.000
(79) (79) (79) (81) (81)
0.994 0.967 0.985 0.992 0.977 1.000
(129) (129) (129) (129) (79) (129)
0.994 0.972 0.986 0.990 0.987 0.994 1.000
(129) (129) (129) (129) (79) (129) (129)
0.797 0.777 0.835 0.789 0.831 0.729 0.784 1.000
(118) (118) (118) (118) (78) (118) (118) (118)
-0.256 -0.265 -0.265 0.074 -0.142 -0.231 -0.275 -0.367 1.000
(116) (116) (116) (152) (76) (116) (116) (112) (306)
Table A2:  Correlation among Alternative Quality Measures
Average pneumonia mortality rate, 2000-2004 (MR)
Quality as revealed by heart-attack patients (HA)
Choice set includes hospitals within 50 miles (50M)
Choice set includes hospitals within 20 miles (20M)
LA market consistent with Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) (GGT)
Revealed quality, benchmark pneumonia analysis (B)
Including all hospitals in 5 metro counties (5C)
Including patients whose nearest hospital is not in market (NNIM)
Conditional-logit model (CL) 
 
 
   
Mean Min Max Std. Dev. IQR N
Revealed quality, benchmark pneumonia analysis -1.42 -6.30 0.81 1.37 1.65 129
Conditional-logit model -1.78 -6.08 0.97 1.46 1.93 129
Including patients whose nearest hospital is not in market -1.44 -6.31 0.81 1.38 1.63 129
Including all hospitals in 5 metro counties -2.80 -84.66 6.44 8.90 2.09 167
LA market consistent with Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) -0.70 -3.73 1.80 1.05 1.48 81
Choice set includes hospitals within 20 miles -1.32 -6.32 0.79 1.36 1.52 129
Choice set includes hospitals within 50 miles -1.30 -6.21 0.85 1.38 1.65 129
Quality as revealed by heart-attack patients -1.80 -8.37 1.37 2.03 2.49 118
Average pneumonia mortality rate, 2000-2004 12.5% 6.6% 19.6% 2.6% 3.5% 116
Table A3:  Summary Statistics for Alternative Quality Measures







































R squared (within) 0.479
Model F test, p value 0.000
F test on hospital fixed effects, p value 0.000
Correlation between observables and fixed effects 0.083
Hausman test of fixed vs. random effects, p value 0.652
Number of hospital-years 612
sample of hospitals.  Benchmark analysis is a fixed-effects specification of cost model.  
Hospital fixed effect embodies revealed revealed quality, leaving quality-only terms 
unidentified.  Standard errors are not corrected for first-stage sampling variability.  * indicates 
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Natural log of total annual stays (Yht)
Natural log of mean Charlson-Deyo index (CDIht)
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Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia choice analysis and benchmark pneumonia 
t · ln CMIht
Other Statistics
t · ln Yht
t · Qh
t · ln CDIht
Time (t)
Qh · ln CDIht 

































R squared 0.851 — 0.846
R squared (within) — — 0.498
Model F test, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
F test on higher-order mortality terms, p value 0.502 0.787 0.865
F test on hospital fixed effects, p value — — 0.000
Correlation between observables and fixed effects 0.000 0.000 -0.113
Hausman test of fixed vs. random effects, p value — — 0.808
Number of hospital-years 533 522 553
percent; average is with respect to 2000-2004.  The negative of mortality is analyzed, because lower mortality 
represents higher quality.  Hospital fixed effect embodies revealed revealed quality, leaving quality-only terms 
unidentified.  Pooled regressions cluster standard errors on the hospital.  Instruments include lagged annual 
mortality and its interactions with hospital characteristics.  Standard errors are not corrected for first-stage 
sampling variability.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
Notes:  Mortality is risk-adjusted 30-day mortality rate for community-acquired pneumonia, measured in 
— — —
Other Statistics
t · ln Yht
t · ln CDIht












Qh · ln CMIht 
ln Yht · Qh
— — —
Table A5:  Analyses of Total Hospital Annual Costs Based on Negative Mortality Rate
Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)
Negative mortality rate, in % (Qh)
—
Natural log of total annual stays (Yht)





ln Yht · ln CDIht
Qh · ln CDIht 
Specification






2 — — —
Natural log of case-mix index (CMIht)













































R squared 0.202 0.060
F statistic 131.62 7.14
N 522 114
acquired pneumonia.  Quality responsiveness is the derivative of hospital 
demand with respect to the average mortality rate.    Standard errors are not 
corrected for first-stage sampling variability.  * indicates statistical significance 
at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
Table A7:  First-Stage Pneumonia Mortality Regressions
Other Statistics
Specification
















Standard errors are not corrected for first-stage 
sampling variability.  * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
Table A6:  First-Stage Revealed Quality Regression
Parameter (Standard Error)
Notes:  Based on benchmark pneumonia choice analysis.  
Other Statistics
Constant
Responsiveness of hospital demand to 







R squared 0.006 —
N
Hausman test of OLS vs. IV, p value
Correlation between mortality and productivity 0.000 -0.093
acquired pneumonia, averaged over 2000-2004.  The negative of mortality 
is analyzed, because lower mortality represents higher quality.  Standard 
errors and p value are not corrected for first-stage sampling variability.  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, and *** 
at 1%.
Table A8:  Decomposition of Average Pneumonia Mortality and 
Productivity
Parameter (Standard Error)




Negative average mortality rate, in %
Other Statistics